Inconsistency-adaptive logics isolate the inconsistencies that are derivable from a premise set, and restrict the rules of Classical Logic only where inconsistencies are involved. From many inconsistent premise sets, disjunctions of contradictions are derivable no disjunct of which is itself derivable. Given such a disjunction, it is often justified to introduce new premises that state, with a certain degree of confidence, that some of the disjuncts are false. This is an important first step on the road to consistency: it narrows down suspicion in inconsistent premise sets and hence locates the real problems among the possible ones. In this paper I present two approaches for handling such new premises in the context of the original premises. The first approach may apparently be combined with all paraconsistent logics. The second approach does not have the same generality, but is decidedly more elegant.
Pole is actually more than one Pole. Then and during next stays in Poland my lodgings were of Middle-European comfort and definitely more cosy. But Jerzy retained his typical smile, suggesting he knows better. Usually he does.
My contribution will be on handling inconsistency, Ghent style with a strong Torun flavour.
The Problem
Although the scientific enterprise is directed at obtaining a body of consistent knowledge, it is well known that inconsistencies occurred in several central episodes of the development of scientific disciplines-see, for example, [19] , [20] , [24] , [18] , [13] , [15] . In some cases an accepted theory-one that was superior to alternatives in view of its problem solving capacity-turned out to be inconsistent. In other cases progress in a discipline was realized by reasoning from several accepted theories that are mutually inconsistent. In still other cases, progress in a discipline was realized by reasoning from a theory and a set of data that are mutually inconsistent.
The reasoning that occurs in such situations is explicated by inconsistencyadaptive logics-see, for example, [3] , [2] , [5] , [23] , [14] , [25] , [12] , [7] , [8] . These logics isolate the involved inconsistencies and in this way provide an interpretation of the premises (theories and/or data) that is as consistent as possible. Precisely this type of interpretation is needed in order to reason from the inconsistent premises and in order to regain consistency.
Inconsistency-adaptive logics provide a maximal consistent interpretation of the premises, but do not themselves resolve the inconsistencies. I have argued on several occasions that the elimination of inconsistencies is not a task of logic but has to rely on empirical data, if the theory is an empirical one, or on conceptual analysis, in sum on extra-logical information. Although I do not want to change this position, I admit that inconsistency-adaptive logics leave the process that leads to consistency a mystery. The aim of the present paper is to clarify part of the mystery: on the road to consistency, logic has to play a role. To be more precise, it has to perform two different tasks. First, the logical analysis of the old theory and, where appropriate, data should indicate which specific extralogical information should be sought. Next, once the information is obtained, logic should handle it, which includes combining it in the suitable way with the old theory. The present paper concerns the first step beyond interpreting the inconsistent premise set as consistently as possible. This will require a bit of explanation.
Suppose that one derived (p ∧ ∼p) ∨ (q ∧ ∼q) ∨ (r ∧ ∼r)
from the premises, but failed to derive (p ∧ ∼p) ∨ (q ∧ ∼q), (p ∧ ∼p) ∨ (r ∧ ∼r), or (q ∧ ∼q) ∨ (r ∧ ∼r). So according to the available insights, the premises require that either p∧∼p or q ∧∼q or r∧∼r holds true, but do not specify which of them does. This will have consequences for interpreting the premises as consistently as possible. On the Reliability strategy, for example, p ∧ ∼p, q ∧ ∼q and r ∧ ∼r are all considered as unreliable, which means that no inference can be made that presupposes one of them to be false.
Of course, only the minimal disjunctions of inconsistencies have an impact. If q ∧ ∼q is derived, then (p ∧ ∼p) ∨ (q ∧ ∼q) is obviously derivable but this does not provide a reason to consider p ∧ ∼p as possibly true. Hence, once a disjunction of abnormalities has been derived, say (1) , it is advisable to try to derive a 'shorter' disjunction, for example (p∧∼p)∨(q∧∼q), etc. This is a sound heuristic advise, and the ensuing search process obviously does not involve new extra-logical information.
This brings us to our problem: when deriving a shorter disjunction of contradictions fails, one may attempt to narrow down the suspect formulas by means of new information. There may be reasons to consider either p or q or r as not suspect. One or more empirical criteria may be considered as extremely reliable. That they univocally lead to p may provide a good reason to consider both ∼p and p ∧ ∼p as false. A different reason may be that p is considered as well entrenched and unproblematic in the scientific discipline, or even in a set of disciplines. Similarly, the 'personal constraints' of a researcher or research group may provide this researcher or group with a reason to consider p as not suspect, and hence to consider p ∧ ∼p as false-as was argued in [17] , there is nothing irrational in such situations, even if a different researcher or research group may take the opposite decision. Especially in mathematical contexts but not only there, the fact that p corresponds to a clear and simple concept, whereas q and r do not, may provide the good reason. And of course, a researcher may just tinker, trying out what becomes of the premises if one of the contradictions is considered as false.
If (1) is derived and one fails to derive a shorter disjunction of contradictions, one will try to obtain new information of the aforementioned type. As (1) is derivable from the premises, these evoke (in the sense of [26] ) the question ?{p ∧ ∼p, q ∧ ∼q, r ∧ ∼r}. Each member of the set is a direct answer to the question. The statement that, for example, p ∧ ∼p is false is an indirect answer in view of (1)-it narrows down {p ∧ ∼p, q ∧ ∼q, r ∧ ∼r} to {q ∧ ∼q, r ∧ ∼r}. Even if the information was available all along, it may have been considered irrelevant, or not have been included in the original premise set because this was supposed to be consistent anyway. So the derivation of a Dab-formula-a disjunction of abnormalities, here contradictions-provokes a heuristic advice (concerning inference) and, if this does not lead to a useful result, provokes the introduction of new information or the attempt to obtain new information.
If the new information offers good reasons to consider both p∧∼p and q ∧∼q as false, r ∧ ∼r is identified as the 'real' inconsistency involved in the premises. This move does not render the premise set consistent. It narrows down the set of formulas that might be inconsistent. This is a sensible step towards restoring consistency. By this step, one locates the real problems, the real inconsistencies, that have to be resolved in order to restore consistency. Moreover, the step has an immediate effect on the maximal consistent interpretation of the premises.
I remarked before that logic has two tasks on the path towards consistency. And we have seen that inconsistency-adaptive logics themselves perform the first task: they indicate which specific extra-logical information should be sought by locating the minimal disjunctions of contradictions or, in undecidable waters, the best candidates in view of present insights in the premises. The rest of the paper is devoted to the the second task: handling the newly gathered information together with the old theory.
A straightforward but naive approach would proceed as follows. Given a minimal disjunction of contradictions, the problem solver might be allowed to state that some of the disjuncts are false. It is possible to do so by means of classical negation, ¬. Given that the original negation of the language, viz. ∼, is paraconsistent, it is advisable to extend the language with classical negation anyway: this does not harm the original premises or their logical treatment and greatly simplifies the metatheoretic stuff. In the present situation, classical negation seems to come in handy at the object level. Indeed, it is sufficient to add ¬(p ∧ ∼p) and ¬(q ∧ ∼q) to the premises of the example in order to derive r ∧ ∼r and hence to locate it as the real inconsistency. This naive approach is not suitable. Suppose that one allows a problem solver to add the new premises ¬(p ∧ ∼p) and ¬(q ∧ ∼q), or to add the new premise r∧∼r. It may turn out later that (p∧∼p)∨(q∧∼q) is derivable from the original premises. If ¬(p ∧ ∼p) and ¬(q ∧ ∼q) were added as new premises, one ends up with a trivial consequence set. If r ∧ ∼r was added as a new premise, one has introduced an inconsistency that was not derivable from the original premises; in other words one has created a problem rather than resolving one. Of course all this has only a serious effect at the predicative level, where there is no negative test for derivability.
Some people might propose to allow the problem solver to withdraw the new premises in such cases. This results in tinkering, not in a logic. That personal constraints of the problem solver play a role in the introduction of new premises is all right: the problem solver is building his or her or its approach to the problem. However, the logic should define derivability. If some premises are defeasible, the logic should eliminate their effects where this is suitable; no intervention of the problem solver should be required.
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The conclusion is that the new premises have to be introduced in such a way that they never lead to triviality and never introduce new inconsistencies.
I shall present a short characterization of inconsistency-adaptive logics in Section 2. This is required for making the paper self-contained. Next I spell out the most obvious approach in Section 3. It results from combining the inconsistency-adaptive logic with a specific prioritized adaptive logic-see for example [9] and [8] for the latter. Given that the new premises are conjectures about the 'safety' of certain formulas, viz. the falsehood of certain inconsistencies (and possibly the truth of other inconsistencies), they are introduced (by the standard prioritized adaptive mechanism) with a lower degree of confidence than the original premises-this come to saying that they are defeasible premises with a certain degree of defeasibility.
A brief digression is in place here. One way to look at the inconsistencyadaptive logics that are presented in Section 2 is to see ∼A as a defeasible classical negation. 'Normally' ∼A is taken to mean that A is false, but where this turns out impossible, ∼A is downgraded to the paraconsistent negation of A-∼A may then be true even if A is true. The new premises are defeasible in a different way. ¬(A ∧ ∼A) states that A ∧ ∼A is false, but is introduced with a degree of confidence which will be expressed by prefixing the statement by a sequence of possibility operators: ♦¬(A ∧ ∼A) or ♦♦¬(A ∧ ∼A), etc. To simplify the notation, ♦ i ¬(A ∧ ∼A) will abbreviate i occurrences of ♦ followed by ¬(A ∧ ∼A). ♦ i ¬(A ∧ ∼A) expresses a lower degree of confidence as i is larger. The prioritized adaptive logic enables one to derive ¬(A ∧ ∼A) from ♦ i ¬(A ∧ ∼A) unless (and until) this is proven false, which roughly means-a precise definition follows in Section 3-that A ∧ ∼A is derived from the original premises and from new premises that have a higher degree of confidence than i. This approach is related to Jaśkowski's, except that Jaśkowski did not consider degrees of confidence and did not come up with a non-monotonic (let alone adaptive) logic-but see [16] .
When I presented the result in a Flemish-Polish logic workshop in Ghent, Wojciech Sady complained about the use of two negations for formalizing premises from natural language. This remark triggered an approach which I present in Section 4. The idea is to handle the new premises in terms of a single negation, priorities being coupled to the degree of complexity of the negated contradiction.
Section 5 contains some comments in conclusion, mainly on the relations between both approaches.
The Environment
I shall briefly introduce two (flat) inconsistency-adaptive logics, and restrict attention to them in the rest of the paper. However, the results from the subsequent sections may be easily adapted to other inconsistency-adaptive logics. A flat adaptive logic AL is characterized by a triple: (i) A lower limit logic: a monotonic logic.
(ii) A set of abnormalities: a set of formulas characterized by a logical form.
(iii) An adaptive strategy: this specifies what it means to interpret the premises 'as normally as possible'. Let us consider the inconsistency-adaptive logics ACLuN1 and ACLuN2. Their predicative versions were studied in [5] . The most recent survey of adaptive logics may be found in [8] . The subsequent description relies on these insights and hence depart from [5] in some respects.
Let L be the standard predicative language, with ∼ as the standard negation, extended (for reasons mentioned before) with a second negation, viz. ¬. Let S, C, V, P r , F and W respectively be the sets of sentential letters, individual constants, individual variables, predicate letters of rank r, formulas, and wffs. Let F be the set of (open and closed) formulas of L, and W the set of closed formulas. CL will denote classical logic.
The lower limit logic will be CLuN, 2 obtained by extending full positive CL with A ∨ ∼A and with suitable axioms for ¬.
3 This system has some properties that might come unexpected. Replacement of Equivalents does not hold in general, viz. does not hold within the scope of ∼-for example CLuN p ≡ (p∨p) but CLuN ∼p ≡ ∼(p ∨ p). The same holds for Replacement of Identicals-for example a = b, P a CLuN P b but a = b, ∼P a CLuN ∼P b.
I now spell out a provably adequate semantics for CLuN. To describe it in a simple way, I extend the language L to the pseudo-language L + by a set of pseudo-constants O which has at least the cardinality of the largest model one wants to consider. Let F + be the set of formulas of L + , W + the set of closed formulas, and
A model M = D, v , in which D is a set and v an assignment function defined by:
The valuation function v M : W + → {0, 1} determined by M is defined by:
The valuation v M is an interpretation of W + , and hence of W, which is what we are interested in. The following definitions are standard:
Where ∃A denotes the existential closure of A, the set of abnormalities is defined as follows: Ω = {∃(A ∧ ∼A) | A ∈ F}. The upper limit logic is obtained by extending CLuN with an axiom that rules out abnormalities, for example (A ∧ ∼A) ⊃ B. This logic is CL, as expected.
The abnormal part of a model M is defined as
CL is provably sound and complete with respect to the set of normal models of CLuN, in other words the CLuN-models M for which Ab(M ) = ∅. The two inconsistency-adaptive logics considered here differ from each other only with respect to the adaptive strategy: Reliability for ACLuN1 and Minimal Abnormality for ACLuN1. We shall see the strategies at work in the dynamic proofs as well as in the semantics.
The lines of an annotated proof consist of five elements: (i) a line number, (ii) a formula, (iii) the line numbers of the formulas from which the formula is derived, and (iv) the rule by which the formula is derived, and (v) a condition, which is a subset of Ω. Lines are added to a proof in view of the rules of inference. With the addition of a new line, the proof is brought to its next stage-think of a stage as a sequence of lines. At each stage, some lines may be marked whereas the others are unmarked. The formulas derived at a stage are those derived in the lines that are unmarked at the stage. A line that is marked at a stage may be unmarked at the next, and vice versa. Marking is governed by the Marking definition.
The rules are common for both logics and are presented here in generic form. As only the conditions of the lines are unusual, let A ∆ abbreviate that A occurs in the proof on the condition ∆, in other words that there is a line that has A as its second element and ∆ as its fifth element. Let Γ be the set of premises. Where ∆ is a finite subset of Ω, Dab(∆) denotes the disjunction (in some preferred order) of the members of ∆.
There is a striking correspondence between dynamic proofs and CLuNproofs: A is derivable on the condition ∆ in a dynamic proof iff A ∨ Dab(∆) is derivable in a (standard) CLuN-proof (define "∨Dab(∅)" as the empty string).
Let us now turn to the marking definitions. Given a dynamic proof, we shall say that Dab(∆) is a minimal Dab-formula at stage s of the proof iff, at that stage, Dab(∆) occurs in the proof on the empty condition and, for any ∆ ⊂ ∆, Dab(∆ ) does not occur in the proof on the empty condition. Where Dab(∆ 1 ), . . . , Dab(∆ n ) are the minimal Dab-formulas at stage s of the proof, U s (Γ) = ∆ 1 ∪ . . . ∪ ∆ n is the set of unreliable formulas at stage s. Definition 2 Marking for Minimal Abnormality (ACLuN2): A line is marked at stage s iff, where A is derived on the condition ∆ in the line, (i) there is no ϕ ∈ Φ s (Γ) such that ϕ ∩ ∆ = ∅, or (ii) for some ϕ ∈ Φ s (Γ), there is no line at which A is derived on a condition Θ for which ϕ ∩ Θ = ∅.
In other words, a line at which A is derived on the condition ∆ is not marked iff (i) ϕ ∩ ∆ = ∅ for some ϕ ∈ Φ s (Γ) and (ii) for any ϕ ∈ Φ s (Γ), there is a line at which A has been derived on a condition Θ for which ϕ ∩ Θ = ∅.
The formulas derived from Γ at a stage of the proof are those that are derived at a line that is unmarked at that stage. As the proof proceeds, unmarked lines may be marked and vice versa. So, it is important that one defines a different, stable, kind of derivability: Definition 3 A is finally derived from Γ on line i of a proof at stage s iff (i) A is the second element of line i, (ii) line i is not marked at stage s, and (iii) any extension of the proof in which line i is marked may be further extended in such a way that line i is unmarked.
Definition 4 Γ ACLuN A (A is finally ACLuN-derivable from Γ) iff A is finally derived on a line of a proof from Γ.
Note that ACLuN is not a logic but a variable name for the logics ACLuN1 and ACLuN2, and that the only difference between these stems from Definitions 1 and 2.
Here is a very simple propositional example of a dynamic proof. Let Γ be {p, ∼q, t, r ⊃ q, ∼p ∨ s, ∼p ∨ q, ∼t ∨ u}.
As lines 8-10 have a non-empty condition, one will try to find out whether the members of the conditions are indeed reliable. It turns out that some are not, as is seen below. At stage 11 (after line 11 is derived), lines 8 and 9 are marked while the other lines are not.
It is easily seen that no other interesting consequences are derivable, and that the marks will not change if the proof is extended (without extending the premise set). So u is ACLuN1-derivable from the premises whereas ∼r and s are not. The proof is utterly simple: all lines marked at stage 11 remain marked at all later stages. If ∼r ∨ u were derived from ∼r or from u, the line at which it is derived would either have the condition {q ∧ ∼q} or the condition {p ∧ ∼p}, and hence will be marked. So ∼r ∨ u is not ACLuN1-derivable from the premises.
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I now turn to the semantics for ACLuN1 and ACLuN2. A minimal Dabconsequence of the premise set Γ is, as one expects, a formula Dab(∆) such that Γ CLuN Dab(∆) and Γ CLuN Dab(∆ ) for any ∆ ⊂ ∆-there is no reference to a stage of a proof here. Where Dab(∆ 1 ), Dab(∆ 2 ), . . . are the minimal Dab-consequences of Γ,
. is the set of formulas that are unreliable with respect to Γ.
Definition 6 Γ ACLuN1 A iff A is verified by all reliable models of Γ.
Definition 8 Γ ACLuN2 A iff A is verified by all minimally abnormal models of Γ.
It does not make sense to say that a model M is reliable or minimally abnormal, but only to say that M is a reliable model (or a minimally abnormal model) of Γ.
Both ACLuN1 and ACLuN2 have been shown (in [5] ) to be sound and complete with respect to their semantics. It has moreover been shown that a proof at a stage (for either logic) offers the best available insight in final derivability in view of the insights in the premises provided by the proof at the stage. In other words, derivability at a stage may be taken as a (defeasible) basis for rational decision-see especially [4] .
In subsequent sections, I shall often write ACLuN to refer to either of ACLuN1 and ACLuN2. Statements in terms of ACLuN also hold true for most other inconsistency-adaptive logics.
The First Way
The approach considered here combines the adaptive logics ACLuN1 and ACLuN2 with an adaptive logic, respectively TuN r and TuN m , that handles the premises of the form ♦ i (A ∧ ∼A). TuN r may be seen as an infinite sequence of adaptive logics that all have the same structure-the first member suitably handles premises of the form ♦A, the second premises of the form ♦ 2 A, etc. This is why the prioritized adaptive logic, if phrased as a single system, has a sequence of sets of abnormalities. Similarly for TuN m . The lower limit logic will be called TuN-it is like T but allows for gluts with respect to negation. Put differently, it is CLuN extended with the Tmodalities. Let L M be the result of extending L with the modalities in the standard way. The pseudo-language L M + is obtained by extending L M with the set of pseudo-constants O.
A TuN-model M is a quintuple W, w 0 , R, D, v in which W is a set of worlds, w 0 ∈ W the real world, R a binary relation on W , D a non-empty set and v an assignment function. The accessability relation R is reflexive. The assignment function is defined by:
The valuation function v M : W M + × W → {0, 1}, determined by the model M is defined by:
etc. is defined as for CLuN. Axiomatically TuN is characterized by CLuN plus the Neccessitation rule, the T-axioms, and the Barcan-formula.
The sets of (modal) abnormalities are
) is an abnormality (of level 1) means that, if A ∧ ∼A is possibly false, then the normal situation is that it is false. In other words, from ♦ i ¬(A ∧ ∼A) one may derive ¬(A ∧ ∼A) 'unless and until proven otherwise'. The abnormal parts of a model M are defined as follows:
The upper limit logic is obtained by adding to TuN the axiom schema ♦ i ¬(A∧∼A) ⊃ ¬(A∧∼A). If, as for the present application, all modal premises are of the form ♦ i ¬(A ∧ ∼A), then the upper limit logic boils down to the CLuN-variant of Triv (CLuN with modalities devoid of meaning).
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From TuN and the Ω i one builds the prioritized adaptive logics TuN r by the Reliability strategy and TuN m by the Minimal Abnormality strategy. Remember that the set of premises Γ is a set of formulas containing modal-free formulas (the original premises) as well as formulas of the form ♦ i ¬(A ∧ ∼A) (the new premises). Suppose that, for some n, i ≤ n for all premises of the form ♦ i ¬(A ∧ ∼A)-the case where all i ∈ N occur is briefly discussed at the end of this section. Where TuN a is used as a general name (the "a" varying over "r" and "m"), we want to have (2) is all right as a definition, it may cause trouble from a computational point of view. This is why we shall circumvent it for the dynamic proofs: in a stage of a proof we shall 'approach' Cn TuN a (Γ) by the order in which marking proceeds. Let us at once move to these dynamic proofs. Final derivability is defined as before. Turning to the semantics, I first recall that n is the largest i for which ♦ i occurs in the premises. Let M vary over TuN-models of Γ. We define: -Σ 0 = {M | M |= Γ}.
9 Precisely this upper limit logic is obtained if one defines Ω i = {∃(A ∧ ♦ i ¬A) | A ∈ F }. The upper limit logic of the combined adaptive logic, which also rules out that members of Ω = {∃(A ∧ ∼A) | A ∈ F } be true, is then Triv.
-Where 0 < i ≤ n, a minimal Dab i -consequence of Γ is a (set-theoretically) shortest Dab i -formula that is true in all M ∈ Σ i−1 . -Where 0 < i ≤ n, and
The Reliable models (TuN r -models) of Γ are the members of Σ n .
We proceed analogously for Minimal Abnormality, but here the matter is simpler. Where Σ 0 is as before:
The Minimal Abnormal models (CLuN m -models) of Γ are the members of Σ n .
Γ TuN r A iff A is verified by all reliable models of Γ. Γ TuN m A iff A is verified by all minimally abnormal models of Γ. It is provable that both logics are sound and complete with respect to their semantics.
To get home, we have to combine the inconsistency-adaptive logics from Section 2 with the prioritized adaptive logics from the present section. As few applications will justify that one combines Reliability for one logic with Minimal Abnormality for the other, two combinations seem most attractive.
As before, the set of (original and new) premises Γ will consist solely of nonmodal formulas and of formulas of the form ♦ i ¬(A∧∼A), and I suppose that all i ≤ n for some n. The logic we are after is obtained by combining flat adaptive logics. Let the combination for Reliability be called N r . What we want is
This may be spelled out as follows:
which makes it transparent that first all premises of the form ♦ i (A ∧ ∼A) are taken into account, starting with i = 1, and next the result is interpreted as consistently as possible. 10 The situation is similar for the Minimal Abnormality combination, N m . We want
In order to avoid confusion, let us rename the Ω from Section 2 to Ω 0 -so
We move to the dynamic proofs. Let Dab(Θ) refer to the disjunction of a Consider a proof at a stage. Depending on the chosen strategy, one first marks the lines in view of level 1 (see Definitions 10 and 11), next in view of level 2, and so on up to the highest level n-I supposed that there was one. Finally one marks the lines in view of level 0.
Consider the simple example of a dynamic ACLuN1-proof from Section 2, and suppose that one introduces the new premise ♦♦¬(p ∧ ∼p). The proof may then be continued as follows: 
As a result line 14 is marked, and the formula of line 11 is again a minimal Dab 0 formula. It follows that U 0 16 (Γ) = {p ∧ ∼p, q ∧ ∼q} and hence that both lines 8 and 9 are marked (in view of level 0) at stage 16. The present premises state that both disjuncts of 11 are false, but, as they attach the same priority to both ¬(p ∧ ∼p) and ¬(q ∧ ∼q), both p ∧ ∼p and q ∧ ∼q are unreliable. It follows that neither s nor ∼r is a N r -consequence of the present premise set. Suppose that the researcher or research group finds a better reason to consider p ∧ ∼p as not suspect, and adds ♦¬(p ∧ ∼p) as a third new premise. If this is the case, the proof would be continued as follows . Γ A is defined as before. It can be shown for both systems that final derivability (which is defined by Definition 4 for all adaptive logics) is sound and complete with respect to the semantics. I do not even sketch the proofs because they are by now standard in view of the fact that the prioritized adaptive logics are themselves combinations of flat adaptive logics-see (2) and (4).
I promised to return to the case in which the premise set is infinite and moreover contains formulas of the form ♦ i ¬(A ∧ ∼A) for all i ∈ N. Let us consider N r . In this case, one can still define Cn TuN r (Γ) as the limit of (2) and settle Cn N r (Γ) by (3) . Similarly for the semantic consequence relation. So the only trouble is with the dynamic proofs. This does not come unexpected. Compactness with respect to the derivability relation fails for nearly all adaptive logics. In some cases the metatheory enables one to get around this. In the other cases, it can still be shown that the dynamic proofs offer a sensible estimate of final derivability-the best possible one in view of the insight in the premises that is provided by the proof. With respect to applications, for example in the philosophy of science, all this is rather esoteric. Thus the kind of application considered in this paper will never require an infinite set of new premises. And it clearly does not make sense to introduce consistency requirements with infinitesimally small priorities, except as a manner of speech.
The Second Way
The approach presented here is attractive in view of its sparing use of logical symbols in the premises-classical negation does not occur in the premises.
Moreover, the approach is rather fascinating as it does not lead to a combination of known adaptive logics but opens up a formerly unexplored path.
Suppose that one derived
and that this actually is a minimal Dab-formula-we are of course back at the terminology of Section 2. Suppose that one introduces ∼(q ∧ ∼q) as a new premise. (6) states that either p∧∼p or q ∧∼q is true but does not specify which of them is true. The new premise denies that q ∧∼q is true. Can this be taken as a reason to consider p ∧ ∼p as 'the real problem' ? If this question is answered in the positive, a second question arises. Having sat at Egypt's meat pots in Section 3, we know the advantages of prioritized denials of inconsistency. So the second question is whether one is able to express defeasible denials of contradictions within the standard predicative language (not recurring to classical negation ¬).
Unlikely as it may appear-it appeared impossible to me when I first tried out the approach-both questions may be answered positively. Let us start with the first problem, and more specifically with a philosophical point. The inconsistency-adaptive logics from Section 2 isolate negations of formulas. For example, p ∧ ∼p is not derivable from q and ∼(p ∨ q). The formula
is CLuN-derivable from (6) together with the new premise ∼(q ∧∼q), and (6) is CLuN-derivable from (7). In other words, to consider the new premise as a good reason to defeasibly derive p ∧ ∼p from (6) comes to considering contradictions of contradictions as more likely false than (simple) contradictions. But is this justifiable? What is so special about ∼(A∧∼A), or about (A∧∼A)∧∼(A∧∼A)? There is an answer to these questions, and a rather convincing one with respect to the intended applications. Given that the original theory was meant as consistent and that CL was taken as its underlying logic, the negation of a contradiction is a logical theorem. So it does not make sense that it is explicitly affirmed by the original premises. In other words, if one goes out of one's way to affirm the negation of a contradiction, then one is obviously affirming something special, in our case, the fact that the contradiction is false-defeasibly of course: unless and until proven otherwise. Some people might see trouble coming from the fact that ∼(A ∧ ∼A) is ACLuN1-derivable from Γ whenever A ∧ ∼A / ∈ U (Γ). 11 However, this reinforces my point rather than weakening it. Indeed, it shows that, even in the context of ACLuN1, it does not make sense to introduce ∼(A ∧ ∼A) as a new premise unless A ∧ ∼A is a disjunct of a minimal Dab-formula of the proof. Given all this, ∼(A ∧ ∼A) can sensibly be taken as a defeasible rejection of A ∧ ∼A.
Of course, I still have to show that the approach is workable from a technical point of view. But let us first turn to the second problem.
The priorities from Section 3 are attractive with respect to the intended application. The conjecture that a certain inconsistency is false may rely on observational data, but the trustworthiness of observational data is affected by error margins and by theory-ladenness; it may rely on personal constraints, but these too may be tentative; and so on. In sum, degrees of confidence come in useful for the new premises. Here is a proposal. If both ∼(q ∧ ∼q) and ∼(p ∧ ∼p) are added as new premises, then the previous reasoning could be applied to let the further premise ∼((q ∧ ∼q) ∧ ∼(q ∧ ∼q)) locate the real problem with p ∧ ∼p. In the present context, this premise expresses a stronger denial of q ∧ ∼q.
But suppose that (6) is derived from the premises, and that ∼((q ∧ ∼q) ∧ ∼(q ∧ ∼q)) is the only new premise. Apparently this premise cannot be assigned a sensible effect on the derivability of disjunctions of contradictions. All that would follow is
and the second disjunct is not even a contradiction. Moreover, apart from (6) itself, no Dab-formula is derivable from (6) and this new premise.
However, there is a solution to this riddle. Although priorities cannot be expressed by negations of contradictions-∼(A∧∼A), ∼((A∧∼A)∧∼(A∧∼A)), etc.-they can be expressed by conjunctions of negations of contradictions thus: (6) is derived from the premises, then ∼(q∧∼q)∧∼((q∧∼q)∧∼(q∧∼q)) is sufficient to put the blame on p ∧ ∼p, for it warrants the derivability of
Indeed, if
Even if ∼(p ∧ ∼p) were also added, it would still follow by CLuN that
and this would be sufficient to eliminate the second disjunct as the 'more complex' contradiction, whence the blame would still be on p ∧ ∼p.
Lest I should need formulas that run out of the margins, let !A abbreviate ∃A ∧ ∼A, whence !!A abbreviates (∃A ∧ ∼A) ∧ ∼(∃A ∧ ∼A), etc. Next let ! i A abbreviate whatever is abbreviated by i exclamation marks followed by A.
A second conventional matter is that the complexity of a contradiction !A will be said to be i if !A is CLuN-equivalent to ! i B in which B is not a contradiction. We seem to have arrived at an approach that is justifiable. We have seen that introducing the new premise ¡ 1 A is a sensible way of rejecting !A if !A is a disjunct of a minimal Dab-formula (at the stage of the proof). Now consider a minimal Dab-formula Dab(∆). It is obvious that from Dab(∆) a Dab-formula Dab(Θ) is CLuN-derivable (possibly Dab(∆) itself) of which each disjunct (each member of Θ) is a contradiction of complexity 1. Let A ∧ ∼A ∈ Θ.
12 Stating ¡ 1 A comes to denying A∧∼A to degree 1; this means that A∧∼A is stated to be false unless all other members of Θ are also denied to degree 1-that is, unless Dab({! 2 B | B ∈ Θ}) is CLuN-derivable from the present premises. Stating ¡ 2 A comes to denying A ∧ ∼A to degree 2; this means that A ∧ ∼A is stated to be false unless all other members of Θ are also denied to degree 2-that is, unless Dab({! 3 B | B ∈ Θ}) is CLuN-derivable from the present premises. And so on.
This approach has an important advantage over the one from Section 3. Suppose that one introduces the new premise ♦ 1 ¬(A ∧ ∼A) and that one later wants to introduce a new premise to deny B ∧ ∼B even more strongly than B ∧ ∼B. Then clearly the only way out is to introduce as a new premise, for example, ♦ 1 ¬(B ∧ ∼B), to replace the premise ♦ 1 ¬(A ∧ ∼A) by ♦ 2 ¬(A ∧ ∼A), and to revise the proof in view of the replaced premise. Such a revision is never required by the present approach. Suppose that one introduced the premise ¡ i A. If one wants to more strongly deny B ∧ ∼B, one introduces a premise ¡ j B with j > i. If one wants to deny B ∧ ∼B less strongly than A ∧ ∼A, but stronger than a contradiction C denied by the premise ¡ i−1 C, one introduces the premise ¡ i B together with ¡ i+1 A (and possibly some other 'upgrading premises' for other formulas). In sum, it is always possible to revise one's views by adding further premises.
So the approach is justifiable. All I have to show is that it is technically sound.
The lower limit logic will of course be CLuN. The strategies will be Reliability and Minimal Abnormality. The only change required concerns the set of abnormalities Ω.
We actually need a sequence of sets of abnormalities, let us call them Ω 1 , Ω 2 , . . . . They are defined as follows:
13 Let us again restrict attention to premise sets for which i ≤ n for all formulas of the form ¡ i A. Dab i (∆) denotes the disjunction of the members of ∆ ⊂ Ω i and will be called a
is a meaningless expression as before. To exemplify the dynamic proofs, consider the example with the same premises as in the previous sections. Of course the three new premises that are consecutively introduced are now formalized respectively as (for example) ¡ 1 p, ¡ 1 q and ¡ 2 p. The logic is CLuN rn . I do not repeat lines 1-7 from Section 2 and present at once stage 20 of the proof.
The marks at stage 20 of the proof are exactly as in the example of Section 3. The reader is prayed to run through the stages of the proof from stage 11 on to see that the marks come and go exactly as they did in Section 3.
We now come to the semantics. Let n be the largest i for which some Dab i (∆) is a CLuN-consequence of Γ and let M vary over CLuN-models of Γ. We define:
The Reliable models (CLuN rn -models) of Γ are the members of Σ 1 .
We proceed analogously for Minimal Abnormality, but here the matter is simpler. Where Σ n+1 is as before:
The Minimal Abnormal models (CLuN mn -models) of Γ are the members of Σ 1 .
It can be shown that, for both strategies, final derivability is sound and complete with respect to the corresponding semantics. Given that CLuN rn can be seen as resulting from the consecutive application of a sequence of flat adaptive logics (CLuN r (n) , CLuN r (n−1 ) , . . . , CLuN r (1 ) , in which the number in parentheses refers to the set of abnormalities and hence to the minimal complexity of the involved abnormalities), the proofs are standard. Similarly for CLuN mn .
In Conclusion
There can be little doubt that the approach from Section 3 is less elegant than the one from Section 4. However the former approach is more general. The reason for this is that the second approach cannot be applied to many paraconsistent logics. It cannot be applied to such logics as CLuNs (see for example [6] ) or LP (see for example [22] ) in which all formulas of the form ∼(A ∧ ∼A) are theorems. It cannot be applied to such logics as the one ascribed to Vasil'ev in [1] or to da Costa's C i systems (see for example [11] ) because there certain formulas of the form ∼(A∧∼A) are logically equivalent to ¬(A∧∼A) and hence express a non-defeasible denial of A ∧ ∼A. I tend to think that, with respect to certain applications, CLuN is superior to all such logics. CLuN enables one to deny a certain contradiction, and does not itself deny all contradictions on a par (and hence vacuously). Nevertheless this denial is defeasible in CLuN, and hence does not entail triviality if the contradiction turns out unavoidable. Precisely the combination of both features makes the approach from Section 4 possible. Of course, the adherents of systems that do not have these features might reply that they can realize the same effect by relying on the approach from Section 3. This requires a more sophisticated language, viz. a modal one, and sophistication need not be a disadvantage provided it remains within reasonable limits. So everyone is bound to like the present paper. In Section 1, I mentioned the possibility to introduce a defeasible premise that selects a disjunct of a Dab 0 -formula as the real inconsistency. This might be realized by extending the first approach to the effect that it can handle premises of the form ♦ i (A ∧ ∼A). The second approach cannot be extended to this effect, which seems a disadvantage. However, some reflection on the situation in the second approach reveals that it is not wise to extend the first approach in the suggested way. Suppose indeed that (1) is derived, and that ♦(r ∧ ∼r) is added as a premise. The effect of this is that, for all that we know of the premises, both p ∧ ∼p and q ∧ ∼q are reliable. In other words, the premise ♦(r ∧ ∼r) does not express that, presumably, r ∧ ∼r is true, but that, presumably, r ∧ ∼r is true whereas both p ∧ ∼p and q ∧ ∼q are false. In other words, one needs to know that both p ∧ ∼p and q ∧ ∼q are presumably unproblematic. But then it is possible to express this by ♦ i ¬(p ∧ ∼p) and ♦ j ¬(q ∧ ∼q), for some (possibly arbitrary) i and j. In sum, introducing new premises of the form ♦ i (A ∧ ∼A) is useless.
The relation between both approaches brings up an old problem: the modal foundation of paraconsistency. This is the kernel of the 'Polish approach to parainconsistency'-see [21] . Suppose that the premises are given as a sequence of sets of formulas of the language L: Γ 0 containing the original premises, and each other Γ i containing prioritized denials of contradictions, with the priority decreasing as i increases. These premises may be expressed within the language of both approaches (Sections 3 and 4). It is obvious that both approaches will lead to results that are in an obvious sense equivalent albeit formulated in a very different language. Now consider the denial of the contradiction A ∧ ∼A that has priority n, and let the maximal priority in the premise set be m. On the modal approach this comes to ♦ n (A ∧ ∼A) or, and taking TuN-derivability into account, to ♦ n (A ∧ ∼A) ∧ ♦ n+1 (A ∧ ∼A) ∧ . . .. On the CLuN-approach it comes to ¡ m−n A or, taking CLuN-derivability into account, to ¡ 1 A ∧ . . . ∧ ¡ m−n A. Of course, the priorities are not absolute, and hence ♦ n (A ∧ ∼A) may be replaced by ♦ r.(n+k) (A ∧ ∼A) whereas ¡ m−n A may be replaced by ¡ (m+s)−(r.(n+k)) A (for suitable values of s, r and k). At first sight, all this suggests that the CLuNapproach is not reducible to the modal one. It appears even less reducible if one realizes that ♦¬(A ∧ ∼A) TuN-entails ♦(¬A ∨ ¬∼A), which is equivalent to ♦¬A ∨ ♦¬∼A, whereas ∼(A ∧ ∼A) CLuN-entails no suitable formula of L corresponding to ♦(¬A ∨ ¬∼A). On the other hand, precisely these insight might contain the clue to a reduction of CLuN.
My final comment concerns applications. I restricted the attention to a theory (possibly conjoined to a set of empirical data) that was meant to be consistent but turned out to be inconsistent. However, narrowing down suspicion in inconsistent premise sets is sensible in nearly any context in which inconsistency arises. In this connection too I refer the reader to [21] . No narrowing down is mentioned there, whence the source is unsuspect. But the reader of the present paper will readily see the use and need for narrowing down suspicion in all inconsistent premise sets mentioned there.
